the alliance for Chinese democracy), the main dissident intellectuals who had taken refuge abroad, and the many leaders of the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement who had taken refuge in France, took part in the creation of the Federation for a Democratic China (FDC).
Whereas the Federation's objective consisted mainly in mobilizing the population in China itself in order to put an end to "One-Party rule", it also recognized the importance of political action in the West, and especially the need to convince Western governments to put pressure on Peking leaders for the democratization of China. For most of the activists present in Paris, the West meant the US, and therefore, most of those who had taken refuge in France decided to emigrate to the United States. Was the émigré dissident community going to become an effective lobby of the type of the Taiwan lobby or the Cuban lobby?
Thirteen years later, the overall picture is, at best, mixed.
I have decided not to include the Tibetan dissidents in the category of Chinese dissident.
Although Tibetan activists have been in touch with Chinese dissidents, their agenda, as the Uyghurs', is quite different. I also decided not to talk about the Falungong, which has very specific ways to influence public opinion and decision makers. I am aware that these decisions might sound arbitrary to many.
PROLOGUE: THE CONTEXT OF US-CHINA RELATIONS
In the last two decades, US-China relations have kept developing and their importance in American domestic politics has been growing, especially since 1989. The end of the cold war has made China, the last largest communist country, a possible adversary of the United States. Besides, during the 13 years that have elapsed since the Tiananmen massacre, Sino-US trade has developed exponentially and the trade deficit, of 10.5 billion in 1990, has reached more than 80 billion US dollars 2 in 2000. The development of China and the changes in the international situation have made Sino-US relations an important issue in American Foreign policy. As such, it has played an important part in the 1992 presidential election, during which Bill Clinton denounced incumbent President Bush's "amoral position" for having failed to emphasize the importance of Human rights in China. During the decade that elapsed since then, the China question has been a bone of contention for various political forces in the US.
Numerous actors intervene: business interests represented by the US-China Chamber of
Commerce lobby in favour of a warm relationship between the two countries; the Taiwan lobby, which is very well structured and has a long-standing relationship with various forces on Capitol Hill and in the military establishment militates for a tough attitude towards Peking; the main Unions, quite powerful with the Democratic party, try to protect American workers from competition by Chinese cheap labor, to name just a few of the actors. We shall try to asses how much Chinese dissidence has been able to become an actor in a game which is characterized by a multiplicity of actors, most of which are much more structured and influential than it is.
The picture is complicated by the fact that both parties have changed attitudes over the years, with the Democrats denouncing the Republicans' compromising attitude in the early 90s whereas George Bush Jr denounced president Clinton's concept of "strategic partnership" during the campaign of 2000. In this fluctuating situtation, it is all the more difficult for a newly emerging force to act efficiently. It must evaluate the political situation quickly, and chose the fields of action with care. The émigrés' influence depends on the strength of organizations, personalities
1) The Difficulty to Structure a Political Organization:
1990-1993: Inspired by Sun Yat-sen's precedent in the early twentieth century, the leaders of the Tiananmen movement decided to unify all the branches of the overseas dissident movement to make it the voice of the broad-based Tiananmen pro-democracy movement.
However, the political inexperience of most activists, the difference of experience between generations, and their scarce knowledge of the way Western political systems function made cooperation difficult. Although there were few differences in terms of analysis of the Chinese political system, the founders of the Federation were at a loss as to how push for the democratization of the motherland: the absence of a network of supporters, of r elay organisations in the PRC reinforced the dissidents'isolation. The fact that people's discontent had not given rise to more demonstrations after June 4 th made it difficult for the new Federation to claim that it represented the wishes of the Chinese people. The activists could not agree on which social group should lead the struggle for democracy, and suspicion ran high between the student leaders and the intellectuals. This division was reflected in the leadership structure where the first chairman and vice-chairman had difficulty to work together.
A second constraint weighed on the efficiency of the FDC: the ignorance of English, and of the ways of the American political system limited the influence of its members. The choice of political scientist Yan Jiaqi population in the motherland, and its deteriorating image of infighting and corruption in the Chinese and Overseas Chinese populations, weakened its capacity to appear as an alternative, albeit distant, to CCP power.
Nevertheless, the obvious legitimacy crisis faced by the CCP in China, the sympathy that the "victims of the Tiananmen" massacre enjoyed with American opinion, gave a the dissident movement an undeniable importance, especially in the first half of the 1990s, even though the FDC had some difficulty to achieve its goal of being considered a viable alternative to the Communist Party. During the first few months of 1990, the student leaders excelled at mobilizing their contacts with the media in order to exert influence on decision makers. The conferences they gave in universities and their popularity with the Chinese residents of the United States gave them some weight: they were often consulted on Chinese affairs.
2) Initial Success
In the early years after the Tiananmen movement, and with the end of the cold war, Chinese dissidents could build upon the immense goodwill which existed in the American public, especially thanks to the continued interest of the media for the Chinese opposition movement.
The movement as a whole, despite its deep divisions, was vocal and its voice was respected in the area of Sino-US relations. Its leaders were consulted by some members of Congress. When Bill Clinton was elected at the White House, he tried to adopt an alternative policy toward China, hoping to exert pressure on the Peking governement so that it relaxed its rule and freed political prisoners if it wanted the renewal of the MFN. During the first year of President Clinton's rule, the White House regularly sought the opinions of major dissidents on this subject. Relations were established, and the prospectives for the emergence of a "dissident lobby" were bright.
However, the White house's interest decreased when in 1994, the President decided to delink the granting of MFN from the human rights situation. This decision, added to an increase of factional infighting, resulted in a weakening of the dissidents' influence.
3) Fragmentation and the importance of personalities
The factionalism which plagued the FDC since its creation became increasingly serious with the passing of years, and was a factor of the decreasing importance of Chinese overseas To sum up, the Chinese opposition movement in the United States has been unable to create an efficient, unified organization, capable or setting an agenda of priorities and push it with the executive and legislative branches of the US Government. Even the most famous dissidents personalities, despite their social capital with the media and with concerned politicians, have had difficulty exerting influence for fear of denunciation by their peers.
But the environment in which they act is a very difficult one. In contrast with the Cuban lobby, they cannot count on a large community of compatriots who have fled the country for political reasons, and have enjoyed long time relations with politicians in the US. And, to the difference of the Taiwanese lobby, they do not represent a government, and lack the financial resources which could help enhance their efficiency.
II. THE RISE OF SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONS: A HIGHER LEVEL OF EFFICIENCY
Seeing the opposition's influence was dwindling in China, the Chinese émigrés concentrated their limited means on lobbying American decision makers. The second part of the 1990s saw the rise of the influence of Emigré Chinese NGOs. China is considered a credible NGO, and its input enjoys a high degree of esteem.
1) Human Rights in China

2) China Labour Bulletin
Building upon his experience as the leader of the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation during the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement, Han Dongfang, who emigrated to the US in 1992, has been working to help protect workers'interests in China. Helped by Human rights watch, which had worked at his liberation, Han has been presented as China's Lech Walesa.
In 1993, he tried to go back to the PRC, but was arrested in Canton and sent to Hong Kong. 
III. SOME CASES OF EMIGRÉ INTERVENTIONS
1) Granting of MFN or PNTR
As we have seen above, in the latter half of the 1990s, the dissident community has had difficulty to adopt a unified position on the need to grant MFN to China or not. However, the whole community has seized the opportunity of the annual debate in Congress to raise the question of China's human rights situation. Every year in late May and early June, dissidents were able to testify, organize demonstrations, and lobby representatives in order to put pressure on the administration so that it raised the question of human rights in its dialogue with China. They also lobbyied hard with the media. With the help of the labor unions, which --worried by the threat that the influx of Chinese cheap goods was putting on American labor --were increasingly hostile to the granting of MFN to China, the dissidents were vocal in their condemnation of Big Business attitudes. Some representatives, such as Nancy Pelosi, who often seeks out the opinion of overseas dissidents, put a strong case for the linkage of MFN to an improvement in the human rights situation. It would be excessive to say that the dissidents alone succeeded in obliging the various administrations to demand prisoners'liberations as a show of goodwill by the Chinese authorities, but they have played their part. They have used the American forces hostile to MFN (or PNTR, or entry into WTO) to advance their agenda, but it is also undeniable that they have been used by these forces to strengthen their position. In these cases, they are presented as the voice of the Chinese people.
2) The UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva
Every March, all the groups of Chinese overseas dissidents are present at the session of the UN Human Rights Commission which takes place in Geneva : HRIC, Wei Jingsheng, the Of course, theirs is simply one voice among others, but it carries some weight in the field of Human rights.
3) The creation of Radio Free Asia
The Bush endorsed the project, but it took until 1996 to set up the station. As Nancy Pelosi said, an independent radio station was deemed necessary to break the stranglehold of dictatorship:
" shows that the US government believes that the dissidents represent a voice which deserves to be heard.
4) Obtaining American media coverage
As we have noted earlier, the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement of 1989 enjoyed very extensive media coverage, and the student leaders became stars of the day. After they arrived in the United States, they were regularly interviewed by the major networks and their opinion was sought out by the New York Times, the Washington Post, etc. Until the mid 90s, every time a major event took place in China, or when there was a Sino-American meeting, papers carried declarations by major dissidents. It was also the case during the protracted negotiations which led to China's entry in the WTO. The overseas dissidents' status has evolved from "voice of the Chinese opposition, of the silenced Chinese people", to that of providers of expert opinions. Wang Dan, who has earned a reputation of moderation, is particularly appreciated by journalists, whereas Wei Jingsheng's positions, which tend toward extremism, are still sought out out of respect for his personal experience.
Famous dissidents'opinion is regularly quoted on issues such as repression of dissent, the death penalty, and the surge of nationalism in the PRC. Although no organisation is ever consulted as such, dissident personalities have been able to build upon the capital of sympathy they enjoy, and, despite the versatility of media attention, are now regarded as a permanent resource to be used, much in the way as are academics. This continuation of media coverage helps the overseas dissident Chinese community to remain an actor on the Sino-US political scene, a fact regularly denounced by the official Chinese press.
CONCLUSION
In the last decade, the US Chinese NGOs have won a status and are now regularly Chinese dissident political organizations have become almost insignificant: they have lost all kind of influence in the motherland, and are unable to exert any pressure whether in the realm of the media or in politics. They are not consulted as such by the administration, and when some individuals are sometimes sought out, it is just to know their personal position.
The various political parties programs are not considered relevant either by the media or by decision makers, and nobody regards them as an alternative to Communist Party Power.
Although Chinese dissidence had a strong capital of goodwill after the Tiananmen massacre, its inability to set up an organised lobby, its tendency to factionalism, have prevented it to become a substantial player in the elaboration of Us policy towards the PRC.
The integration of the human rights factor in Foreign policy during the last decade -a phenomenon which is not linked to Sino-US relations -has made for the emergence of Chinese NGOs which lobby on specific issues. They have become a permanent actor who is regularly consulted, allowing the voice of the Overseas Chinese pro-democracy movement to be heard in the organs of power.
Given the scattered characteristic of the Overseas Chinese community, its scarcity of resources, its small numbers, and its rather recent character, this is not a small achievement.
When Chinese dissidents arrived in the United States, they had absolutely no knowledge of the way the American system functioned, they couldn't count on a politicized community of emigrants, and their only capital was the media coverage they had enjoyed during the two months of the Tian'anmen movement. It is well-known that this capital is pretty volatile. The fact that in little more than a decade, they were able to set up human rights organizations, and issue oriented associations which are regularly consulted, even when the international context is not favorable (for example, the concentration of US Foreign policy on the war on terror), must be put to their credit.
However, on the eve of President Jiang Zemin's official trip to the United States in October 2002, not a single Chinese dissident was freed from jail seems to indicate that the safeguarding of dissidents' rights is not a top priority of the Bush administration.
